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I. Introduction
Refocused by the work of Lazear (1990) , analysis of the impact of job security provisions on labor market outcomes was among the most studied topics in labor economics during the decade of the 1990s 1 and, now extending beyond proximate causation, shows every sign of continuing to be a key research theme in the first decade of the new millennium (see, in particular, Botero et al., 2003) . Interest in employment protection remains keen because of continuing high unemployment and sluggish growth in much of Europe. But the economics profession has failed to provide consistent results on the consequences of employment protection, as is evidenced by the very pessimistic conclusions of, say, Heckman and Pagés (2000) on the one hand and the guarded optimism of the OECD (1999) on the other.
Although theory can provide the basis for different expectations regarding the effects of employment protection on labor market outcomes, data limitations would seem in this case to have played a more important role than usual in accounting for diversity of finding (on which, see Addison and Teixeira, 2003) . The data problems are reflected in models that are parsimonious in both the range of explanatory variables deployed and in the time frame examined. To be sure, in the years following Lazear's pioneering analysis the data situation has improved in terms of refinements to the key independent variable and with the availability of information on new regressors. But data constraints have continued to cast a long shadow over the economic analysis of employment protection. In particular, the needs of wider country coverage and an extended time series have consequences for the number of explanatory variables than can be included in the empirical model. The tradeoffs that have to be made might be expected to encourage more humility on the part of investigators than is apparent in the literature.
The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, we seek to document the problems arising from the prototypical parsimonious model, using Lazear's famous paper as an organizing device. In updating Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000) , we will further discuss the robustness of Lazear's major predictions as to the role of his preferred measure of job security (viz. the no-fault severance pay granted to a blue-collar worker with 10 years service, or SEV) on various employment indicators. Our sample covers an 1 departure, we will also address the course of long-term unemployment -and drop the average hours worked measure used by Lazear -albeit for a much shorter period .
Our second goal is to discuss the sensitivity of the basic employment protection result to a different and more comprehensive measure of job protection (e.g. the OECD composite index of the severity or coerciveness of employment laws) and other labor market institutions. Replacement of the partial indicator SEV by some composite index capturing other seemingly important aspects of the job regulatory framework -such as a measure of procedural delays in dismissals and the permissibility of fixed-term contracts -is expected to improve the explanatory power of the model, although this advantage might be compromised or undercut by a shortened time series. For its part, the failure to include variables such as the degree of collective bargaining coverage or the degree of employee and employer coordination in wage bargaining might be a more serious source of bias in the estimated parameters than the use of such a partial indicator of employment protection.
As a practical matter, most measures of 'labor market institutions' are seldom available in a continuous form. Rather, they are one-off purpose-built constructs or at best only observed at a few points in time. 2 This reality leaves the researcher with two options: either assume these variables are roughly constant over time and run the model on fixed institutions (in which case the analysis can be extended to cover almost half a century), or instead assume time-varying institutions and trade a presumably more informative set of institutions off against a substantially smaller number of observations (via the reduction in the respective time series). To conduct our 'robustness test' of the parsimonious specification used by Lazear, therefore, we shall follow two routes. First, we use annual data in conjunction with fixed institutions throughout (i.e. from 1956 up to 1999). Second, and this is our preferred route, we average our annual data on (four) labor market performance indicators over 5-year periods and use time-varying institutions for which we have observations at different moments in time (at least three). The sample period in this case is necessarily shorter and covers the period 1970-99 (1979-99 in the case of the long-term unemployment equation).
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Assuming fixed labor market institutions over a period of almost half a centurythe first route -seems at first glance rather heroic, 3 but the pooling of cross-section and time-series data offers an indication of the effect of time-varying severance pay over an extended period that is embedded within in a richer institutional context. The second route, by dropping the assumption of fixed institutions, reduces both the sample period and the number of institutions, but eliminates the need for interpolation in order to obtain (artificial) annual time-varying data. This approach, which also allows the researcher to focus on the long-term impact of policy intervention in labor markets, has found some favor in the literature (see Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; and Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2001) . Note that our set of time-varying labor institutions and range of labor market performance indicators is wider than has been used in this literature.
II. Modeling and Data

Specification
The sample panel structure of our database allows for a wide range of sensitivity tests. In the most favorable case, we will be able to work with data on 21 OECD countries over 44 consecutive years.
We will begin with the standard Lazear specification containing country specific effects, which can be written:
where y denotes the labor market outcome, X is the set of explanatory and control variables, and c captures the country specific effect. In the original model, the vector X included severance pay, the proportion of the population that is aged between 25 and 65, and the growth in GDP per capita. Lazear also adds a quadratic time trend. At this stage, the model assumes away any reverse causation or endogeneity of the explanatory variables -although subsequently addresses the causality issue by, inter al., regressing changes in severance pay between t and t+1 on levels at time t of three of the four dependent variables. In our fitted regressions we will only address directly the problems arising from autocorrelation, where our first-pass solution will be to assume a (common) first-order serially correlated error term. Specifically, this approach 3 will be applied in generating Tables 2 through 4 which cover the sample period 1956-1999. 4 Extending the vector X of explanatory variables in equation (1) varying variables -GLS random effects estimates will be used rather than the standard fixed effects model. Within this framework we will also introduce time dummies to proxy unobserved cross-country (common) shocks. This approach is followed in Tables 5   through 7 , and the general formulation can be described as follows:
where t denotes the 5-year periods, d t is the time effect for period t, and X now contains the institutional variables.
Our final model extension includes the interaction of labor market institutions and time (i.e. unobserved shocks). The interaction terms are intended to capture the 'product' of shocks and institutions, the presumption being that a particularly unfavourable labor market regulation will impact labor market performance more severely in bad times. In this case, we use a nonlinear specification of the following type:
Our findings using this specification are contained in Table 8 , with all variables being expressed in terms of deviations from the sample mean.
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Data
Our database contains observations on a maximum of 21 OECD countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, and Israel. Information on the country sample, labor market outcomes, and explanatory variables for the period 1956-84 is provided in Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000) . For present purposes, we limit our comments to how we updated this information between 1985 and 1999.
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The employment population ratio (EMPPOP), the unemployment rate (UNRATE), and the labor force participation rate (LFPR) were updated using the OECD publication We also updated the severance payment variable (i.e. the statutory entitlement in months of pay due to a blue-collar worker with 10 years of service at termination, separated for reasons unconnected with his/her behaviour), using the detailed information on dismissals procedures for 1992-99 contained in Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (2000) . This material covers only 11 OECD countries -Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. We therefore supplemented it with data for other countries from the OECD Employment Outlook (1999, Table 2 .2) which documents the changes in severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals in the 1990s. Using this procedure, it was possible to code the severance payment variable after 1992 for all countries other than Greece and
Israel.
( Table 1 near here) To set our severance pay measure in wider relief, we also obtained data on the severance pay due to a 40 year-old white-collar employee made redundant after 10 years of service. These two indicators were then converted into rankings (in ascending order of stringency) and are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 . Column (3) of this table also gives the country ranking order derived from Heckman and Pagé's (2000) cardinal measure of firing costs (which controls for the entire tenure-severance pay profile), while in columns (4) through (8) we introduce some other widely used indices of stringency of employment protection laws, including the employment protection index used by Nickell (1977) . Finally, columns (9) and (10) of the table present the corresponding country rankings of more narrowly defined indices of industrial relations and social security laws, respectively.
As shown by the Spearman ranking correlation at the foot of Table 1 , the three measures of severance pay in columns (1) to (3) (4), (6), (7), and (8) As mentioned above, since none of these series is available on a yearly basis, we constructed 5-year averages (1970-99) using the interpolations described in Appendix Table 1 . Data sources and variable definitions are also included in this table, as well as Nickell's (1997) time-invariant employment protection index.
III. Findings
As noted earlier, Lazear's pioneering study acted as the catalyst for more intensive and systematic study of the effects of job security provisions on labor market performance.
After more than a decade since its publication, the Lazear argument that severance pay reduces employment and elevates joblessness (in imperfectly competitive markets) not only remains a mainstay of orthodoxy but also continues to attract broad empirical support (see the survey by Addison and Teixeira, 2003) . In what follows while we do not claim to detect any evidence suggesting pro-employment effects of stringent labor regulation, we will nonetheless contend that the more flamboyant empirical findings in the spirit of Lazear need to be interpreted with caution.
6
To begin with, we take Lazear's parsimonious model and re-estimate it using an additional 15 years of data. Next, in recognition that much data on labor market institutions has only become available in recent years, we test the robustness of the original model to the inclusion of an extended set of such explanatory variables, and in the process address some more contemporary issues. To repeat, in this stage of our empirical analysis we shall look at the effects of severance pay on unemployment and employment for a longer sample period than does Lazear (as previously noted, the exception is the long-term unemployment outcome measure that we substitute for Lazear's working time indicator and for which we have a shorter run of data), and in a framework that accommodates time-varying labor market institutions.
( Table 2 near here) 
GROWTH.SEV interaction and the well-determined effects of the population control
WRKAGE.) Using a shorter time-series, it also appears that the association between SEV and long-term unemployment, LTUNRATE, is negative and well determined (column 3).
( Table 3 near here) Since there no obvious reason to neglect national idiosyncracies, Table 3 shows the effect of introducing country fixed effects. Robustness is clearly an issue. The introduction of country dummies renders the coefficient estimates of SEV statistically insignificant in both the EMPPOP and LTUNRATE regressions. The association between SEV and UNRATE remains positive and well determined while there is a sign reversal in the case of LFPR. The absence of country fixed effects is statistically rejected in all regressions at the .01 level.
( Table 4 near here) 7
We also tested for the presence of autocorrelation. Table 4 gives the results of fitting the fixed effects model assuming a first-order autocorrelation term. It can be seen that the null of no serial (first-order) correlation is clearly rejected. As it is apparent, the re-estimation takes no prisoners: none of the coefficient estimates for SEV is any longer statistically significant at conventional levels.
At this point we are of course reminded of the parsimonious nature of the Lazear model. This is next issue to be tackled. But thus far at least we would conclude that the Lazear model has failed to pass muster. This conclusion is also reached by Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000) . The difference here is that we are updating the database with information for more recent years that, with the uptick of unemployment, might perhaps have been expected to offer a more promising milieu for the model.
The parsimony of Lazear's specification has been addressed in various ways in the subsequent literature. But one amendment has proved increasingly popular, namely, the class of models whose general specification is described in equation (2) ( Table 5 near here) We begin with a quasi-replication of Nickell's (1997) approach in Table 5 . In this exercise the left hand side variables are again extracted from our own database, whereas the right hand side variables are taken from Nickell. The surprising result is the statistical insignificance of most of the parameter estimates. But there is some support for Lazear's findings: the higher the EPL ranking (i.e. the more generous employment protection), the lower the employment population ratio and labor force participation. Moreover, the longterm unemployment rate -but not overall unemployment -is also impacted unfavourably by employment protection legislation. Appendix Table 2 reports a somewhat different exercise in which both the right-hand side and left-hand side variables are taken from our own database, with the exception of ALMP and benefit duration. There is obvious 8 corroboration of the findings in Table 5 . Taken together, these results suggest that quasicross-section data (two data points spanning two decades) if they do not make a strong case for labor market institutions do offer a measure of support for Lazear. Tables 6 and 7 show the more interesting case in which the number of data points has been enlarged. But this extension is not achieved without cost. Thus, in Table 6 , we have a maximum of nine periods covering the entire sample period 1956-99 and seven fixed labor market institutional variables (the replacement rate, benefit duration, ALMP, union density, union coverage, union and employer coordination, and the tax wedge) plus the severance pay variable. In Table 7 the sample period is 1970-99, but we have a smaller number of labor market institutions which are now time varying. The Nickell study considered eight institutional variables of which one is time-invariant (EPL).
( Tables 6 and 7 near here) Clearly, these innovations produce an improvement in the precision of the institutional variables in the case of UNRATE (in both tables). For the other regressions (EMPPOP, LTUNRATE, and LFPR), the coefficient estimates are statistically significant in just 6 out of 24 cases in Table 6 and in only 3 out 18 cases in Table 7 . But the SEV coefficient is now well determined only in 3 out of 8 regressions (taking Tables 6 and 7 together), while in Table 5 and the Appendix Table 2 it was well determined in 6 out of 8 cases.
We should also report the results from a different exercise using annual data (1956-99) in which we added seven fixed institutional variables (including the tax wedge)
to the full set of original Lazear regressors. 6 In this procedure 14 out of 32 (i.e. 8 x 4) coefficients estimates were found to be statistically significant, which is a slight improvement over Table 6 , for example, where 11 such estimates were well determined.
In particular, the SEV variable was positively signed and statistically significant in the UNRATE and LTUNRATE equations (albeit only at the .10 level in the latter). Bearing in mind the results from Table 4 above, it can be seen that the SEV coefficient estimate does show some sensitivity to the inclusion of labor market institutions. Based on the same type of augmented-Lazear specification we then made an attempt to determine the degree of sensitivity of the severance pay coefficient in Table 4 to the introduction of all possible combinations of institutional variables (viz. the seven fixed measures mentioned above).
From this exercise it emerged that the SEV coefficient estimate was never statistically significant in the EMPPOP regression, but was always positive and well determined in the in the UNRATE regression. The 'addition' of the institutional covariates to the LTUNRATE regression yielded a marginally statistically significant coefficient estimate for SEV in roughly 50 percent of the cases, while in the LFPR equation the estimate was statistically significant (although on this occasion at both the 0.05 and 0.10 levels) in approximately two-thirds of all cases. In sum, while the sensitivity of the SEV coefficient in the EMPPOP equation seems to be low, in the other three cases -UNRATE, LFPR and LTUNRATE -sensitivity to model specification cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, the consequences for standard Lazear equations of ignoring labor market institutions are arguably less severe than might be expected, although a more definite conclusion necessarily awaits the provision of better (i.e. annual) data on institutions.
We should also note that we experimented with alternative measures of employment protection legislation in substitution for SEV and Nickell's (1997) EPL index. But the broad picture is unchanged: the role of institutions is less 'active' than one might expect. Our finding that institutions seem to be of greater importance in explaining overall unemployment than the other indicators is also worthy of note. To some degree, it parts company with the notion that the impact of labor regulations on unemployment is more ambiguous than its effects on employment.
These remarks bring us finally to model (3) . In this model, it is hypothesized that labor institutions only reveal their true 'color' in conjunction with adverse economic conditions (e.g. negative shocks). Accordingly, if a given country is 'endowed' with a non-employment friendly set of labor laws, the unfavourable impact of the latter may not surface if that nation fails to experience hard times. The non-linear specification of equation (3) is particularly suited to address the interaction between (observed or unobserved) shocks and institutions.
In fitting this model to the data we again consider the sample period 1970-99 and the same 5-year averages as before. In the case of the long-term unemployment regression, none of the coefficient estimates is statistically significant. What these results show is the seemingly inability of labor market institutions as a whole to materially impact labor market outcomes under the more realistic scenario of time-varying indicators. The SEV variable, with the exception of the unemployment case, does not seem to play any particularly prominent role either. The attenuated role of collective bargaining coordination is further weakened.
IV. Conclusions
The effects of job security provisions on job turnover (i.e. job creation and job 4. Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000) discuss the problems arising from a panel specification such as equation (1).
5. In this case, the difference between the coefficient estimate for the first time dummy and the last time dummy gives the change in y it due to exogenous shocks (if
). We do not discuss the case of observable shocks.
6. This exercise was carried out using the GLS random effects model to allow the presence of time-invariant regressors. Table 1 ; Nickell (1997), Table 4 ; OECD (1994), Table 6 .7, column (2); OECD (1999), Table 2 .5, column (7); Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999) , Table A , column (1); and Botero et al. (2003) , Tables II and III ( columns (8) , (9), and (10) provide rankings of the stringency of employment, industrial relations, and social security laws, respectively). a *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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